

## American Security Policy toward Northeast Asia : Focusing on Theater Missile Defense (TMD)

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### I. Introduction : Problem and Theory

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. defense planners and weapons builders have sought appropriations from the U.S. Congress to develop missile defense systems which would be able to protect the U.S. and its allies against the threat of attack by nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. The U.S. defense budget for fiscal 2001 includes a \$4.491 billion appropriation to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to continue research, development and procurement on its weapons programs.<sup>1)</sup> More than one-third of BMDO's budget is earmarked for theater missile defense (TMD),<sup>2)</sup> a series of weapons systems designed to shoot down NBC weapons aimed at vulnerable American allies located in regional hot spots such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

In August, 1999, the U.S. and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which began a bilateral collaboration in the research and development of TMD technology. Although the MOU does not commit Japan to procure or deploy any weapons system which results from this work, it nevertheless raises questions for Northeast Asian nations regarding its purpose. In China, for example, defense analysts suspect that work done pursuant to the MOU will lead to a TMD system that will extend

to Taiwan, a result they oppose most vigorously.<sup>3)</sup>

Even if TMD does not extend to Taiwan, Chinese analysts worry that the MOU indicates a strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, which may be threatening to Chinese national interests.<sup>4)</sup>

Unless such suspicions are acknowledged and answered, TMD could have a destabilizing effect on the balance of power in Northeast Asia. At present, any such destabilization would be at odds with the interests of both Japan and the U.S. because of the number of nations in the region that are capable of building up weapons stockpiles in the face of any perceived danger. Decision-makers in both countries must be able to assess the impact of such policy developments as the U.S.-Japan MOU or congressional spending for TMD on China or other potential regional adversaries in Northeast Asia. In this paper, I focus on decision-makers in the U.S. Congress and the degree to which they assess such impacts in determining their support for TMD.

In this paper, I attempt to assess the role of the U.S. Congress in TMD policy-making by looking at those factors which seem to motivate members of Congress to support expansion of TMD programs. I recognize that TMD expenditures do not directly benefit the U.S., but rather serve the interests of its allies who are vulnerable to attack from missile-launching adversaries.

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### [Key Words]

Northeast Asian Security, U.S. Congress, Theater Missile Defense (TMD), U.S.-Japan alliance, TMD Improvement Act of 1998

I assume at the outset that members of Congress identify U.S. defense interests with the security of its allies, and fund the various defense programs of the U.S. with alliance concerns in mind. I do not believe, however, that this assumption alone explains current defense appropriations or predicts future ones for TMD. Since members of Congress, like all elected officials, are directly accountable to their own constituents and need money to fund reelection campaigns, I think it is necessary to investigate the relevance of these factors in motivating a member to support TMD expansion. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to explore, in a broad and general way, the relative importance of alliance concerns, constituent interests and campaign finance in the decision to support increased funding for TMD.

My theoretical approach holds that the members of the U.S. Congress are “single-minded seekers of reelection” whose behavior in office is driven by “the electoral connection.”<sup>51</sup> The electoral connection is the link between the things members of Congress do as representatives and the probability of their future reelection. It reflects the idea that members will choose to perform those actions that enhance future reelection probabilities, and to reject actions that tend to diminish those probabilities. In order to strengthen the electoral connection, members help constituents, interest groups and campaign donors achieve policy goals. The same motivation leads members to support congressional colleagues and party leaders. At the same time, however, since addressing the concerns of military allies with regard to acquisition or deployment of new weapons systems has little effect on the reelection probabilities of most members, they devote relatively little of their time to that problem.

In parts II through IV of this paper, I explore the historical background of TMD, outline the capabilities and current status of major TMD programs, and briefly

discuss the alliance implications of U.S.–Japan TMD collaboration. In part V, I look at the Theater Missile Defense Improvement Act of 1998 as a case study of congressional decision making on TMD. In this part of the paper, my research focuses on the members of the Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Committee on National Security. This group performed the fact finding analysis, wrote the TMD Improvement Act and voted unanimously to report it to the floor of the House of Representatives for a vote. My evidence suggests that members of Congress who support spending on missile defense do so to benefit their constituents and campaign contributors with little regard to sensitive issues regarding the U.S.–Japan security relationship.

## II. Historical Background of TMD

TMD denotes a category of weapons systems that use radar and satellite communications to track theater-range enemy missiles and destroy them with highly accurate defensive missiles. As I mentioned at the outset, TMD systems are being created to answer the threat of missile use in regional conflicts where the combination NBC weapons with theater-range missiles endangers the U.S. and its allies. Clearly, even small-scale theater missile threats, coupled with NBC weapons, dramatically raise the potential costs and risks of military operations. The need to protect U.S. allies from NBC weapons and deter their use in theater-range missiles may soon make TMD an important part of Northeast Asian security strategy. As long as China considers Taiwan its own, as long as North Korea remains a potential threat to Japan, and as long as both China and North Korea continue to develop their offensive missile capabilities, missile defense will be a concern in Northeast Asia.

Today’s TMD programs evolved from President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or “Star

Wars.”<sup>6)</sup> As outlined by President Reagan in 1983, SDI had the purpose of defeating a massive attack upon the U.S. by missiles launched from the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, this Cold War defense strategy had to either be scrapped or modified to meet the needs of the “new world order.” By 1991, U.S. defense experts had successfully argued that the most serious threat to U.S. territory would be terrorist attacks involving only small numbers of missiles, and that deployed U.S. forces would be vulnerable to short range, theater missiles.

The Persian Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated the truth of the latter proposition when, for the first time, defensive missiles (American Patriots) engaged enemy offensive missiles (Iraqi Scuds). On February 25, 1991, a Scud missile attack near Dharan, Saudi Arabia killed twenty-eight Americans and wounded another one hundred. Only a month before the attack, President Bush had announced the refocusing of the SDI program from defense against massive Soviet missile attacks to one aimed at protection against limited strikes like those seen in the Gulf War. Efforts to upgrade the Patriot system began immediately. At the time President Bush left office, the five-year projected budget for missile defense was \$39 billion.<sup>7)</sup>

President Clinton reduced the executive branch commitment to the program by more than fifty percent to \$18 billion over five years when he took office in 1993.<sup>8)</sup> From the beginning, the Clinton Administration took up the task of reviewing U.S. post-Cold War defense strategies. Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, was convinced that SDI had been useful in bringing about the end of the Cold War despite the fact that it had never gotten farther than the drawing board.<sup>9)</sup> A Democrat, Aspin had been Chairman of the House National Security Committee (now named the Armed Services Committee) during the years of the Democratic majority. He knew that for many years

during the Cold War the members of that committee had shored up the sagging economies of their districts by building new military bases in them or by expanding and modernizing older ones. He was also aware that by the mid-1990’s those bases had become too numerous and costly. Their presence was helping to inflate an already bloated defense budget. Some bases would have to be closed simply to save money, but the decision to close them would be a bitter political pill. Work on new, high technology weapons systems, like ballistic missile defense, could be one way of managing the transition and sweetening the pill. While many Democrats criticized SDI for its high cost and dubious feasibility, Aspin may have realized that money spent on research and development could produce private sector employment for many people in at least a few of the places hard hit by base closures.

As Secretary of Defense, Aspin assigned top priority to missile defense. He renamed the missile defense agency the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), and projected a \$12 billion budget over five years to three major TMD research and development projects.<sup>10)</sup> One was a new Patriot missile system, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3); the second, a sea-based system with missiles mounted on Aegis-class destroyers called Navy Area Defense (NAD), and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to defend against longer range missiles. Within a few years, two more projects acquired major program status, a sea-based version of THAAD called the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program, and the Medium Extended Area Defense System (MEADS), a land-based system intended for deployment in Europe. The Clinton Administration commitment to TMD, however, was not as great as that of Congress, especially after the Republican Party gained control of both houses subsequent to the 1994 election. In 1998, for example, Congress added \$1 billion to the Department of Defense

budget request for missile defense as part of an omnibus appropriations bill passed just before Congress adjourned that year.<sup>11)</sup> By this time TMD seemed to benefit indirectly from the debate between Congress and the Administration over NMD because increases in funding for NMD were associated with similar, but slightly lesser, increases for TMD. In this debate, the Administration attempted to hold down defense spending in order to reduce budget deficits, while Republicans and Democrats alike in Congress sought to increase missile defense spending in order to improve economic conditions in their states and districts and to claim credit for any such improvements.

### III. Capabilities and Current Funding of Major TMD programs

The major TMD programs divide into two categories : “lower tier”, or low altitude, and “upper tier”, or high altitude. PAC-3, NAD and MEADS are all of the first category, THAAD and NTW of the second. Table 1 below compares the five basic TMD systems according to type of warhead used, the mode of transport and the range of the missiles against which the system can defend.<sup>12)</sup> Among the lower tier

defenses, PAC-3 is mounted and transported on trucks and has the ability to defend small areas against missiles with ranges up to 1,500 kilometers. PAC-3 does not have an explosive warhead, but instead uses a “hit-to-kill” interceptor, which destroys its target by hitting it directly. The NAD system, on the other hand, is ship-based, uses an explosive warhead, and can defend against missiles with ranges up to 600–1,000 kilometers. By comparison, MEADS is a close relative to PAC-3 using the same type of warhead and designed to defend against missiles having the same range as PAC-3. Like PAC-3, MEADS is truck-mounted, but it is expected to be more mobile than PAC-3 and to be able to move along with ground troops in the field.

The two upper tier defenses use hit-to-kill interceptors. THAAD is land-based, but transportable by aircraft. It will intercept missiles high in the atmosphere or above it at altitudes of more than forty kilometers. NTW is ship-based and will intercept targets only above the atmosphere using a “LEAP” (lightweight exo-atmospheric projectile) kinetic kill vehicle. It will be mounted on Aegis-class destroyers the construction of which is not part of the missile

Table 1 .  
Principle Capabilities of Key U.S. Theater Missile Defense Systems

	Type of Warhead	Mode of Transport	Range of Missiles Defended Against
Lower Tier Systems			
PAC-3	Hit-to-Kill	Truck-mounted	1500km
NAD	Explosive	Ship-based	600-1000km
MEADS	Hit-to-Kill	Truck-mounted	1500km
Upper Tier Systems			
THAAD	Hit-to-Kill	Aircraft	10,000km
NTW	Hit-to-Kill	Ship-based	10,000km



defense budget. Once they are fully developed, both upper tier defenses will also have the ability to defend against inter-continental ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 10,000 kilometers.

Table 2 below gives funding levels for BMDO's missile defense programs for the 1999, 2000 and 2001 fiscal years. The table also gives the percent of change in funding over the previous year for 2000 and 2001.<sup>131</sup>

Congressional funding for NMD fell to \$965.2 million in fiscal 2000 from nearly \$1.7 billion in 1999, a 42.8 percent drop. But Congress nearly doubled its support for NMD in 2001 by allocating over \$1.9 billion for the current fiscal year. Among TMD programs, congressional funding for NAD has averaged about \$280 million over the three-year period with slight year-to-year fluctuations—up 14.3 percent in 2000, down 15.4 percent in 2001. NTW, meanwhile, has grown by small, consistent increments over the period from \$366.2 million in 1999 to \$375.8 million in 2000 to

\$382.7 million next year. PAC-3 and THAAD, however, saw large increases in 2000, 23.2 percent and 39.6 percent respectively, and now face respective cutbacks of 14.9 percent and 8.8 percent. They are the two programs receiving the highest level of funding over the three-year period with a combined cost per year of close to \$1 billion. Congress has given the MEADS program the largest proportional increases from \$11.7 million in fiscal 1999 to \$48.6 million in 2000 to \$63.2 million in 2001. Together NMD and TMD account for about eighty percent of the total BMDO budget each year. That money is used primarily for research, development, testing and evaluation, with some used for procurement. The other twenty percent of the BMDO budget funds various technical support programs and includes a separate budget line for international cooperation programs. The budget does not include the money used to build such things as the Aegis destroyers, which carry the sea-

**Table 2 .**  
**U.S. Missile Defense Program Budgets**  
(Fiscal years, in millions of dollars)

	1999	2000	Percent Change	2001	Percent Change
National Missile Defense :	\$1,687.9	\$965.2	-42.8	\$1,916.4	98.5
Theater Missile Defense systems :					
NAD	284.6	325.4	14.3	274.2	-15.4
NTW	366.3	375.8	3.1	382.7	1.8
PAC-3	424.6	522.9	23.2	446.5	-14.9
THAAD	431.9	603.0	39.6	549.9	-8.8
MEADS	11.7	48.6	315.4	63.2	30.0
Total TMD Budget	\$1,519.1	\$1,875.7	23.5	\$1,716.5	-8.5
NMD+TMD Total	\$3,207.0	\$2,840.9	-11.4	\$3,632.9	27.9

Source : Pat Towell, "Pentagon's Chief of Testing Reinforces Bipartisan Movement to Postpone Anti-Missile System," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, Vol. 58, No. 8 (February 19, 2000) p. 373. Percent figures were calculated by the author and represent the percent change from the previous fiscal year's budget.

based missiles for NAD and NTW. Nor does it include a variety of radar and satellite communications components of TMD.

The total budget for these five TMD programs went from \$1.519 billion in 1999 to \$1.876 billion in 2000 and \$1.716 billion in the 2001 proposed budget while the overall BMDO budget went from \$4.173 billion to \$3.806 billion to \$4.491 billion over the same three years. This shift in congressionally set priorities means that TMD will represent 38.2 percent of the total BMDO budget in fiscal 2001 compared to 49.3 percent in 2000 while NMD will go from twenty-four percent to nearly half. This not only reflects the higher costs of NMD research and development but also illustrates the growing sensitivity within Congress to the potential salience of NMD as an issue which is relevant to reelection opportunities in the future.

#### IV. Alliance Implications

The tenuous security situation in Northeast Asia in the early 1990's led U.S. defense strategists to try to engage Japan in a cooperative effort to develop TMD systems to be deployed in the region, but the effort was complicated by trade tensions between Washington and Tokyo. When Defense Secretary Aspin made the first attempt to involve Japan more directly in TMD, he posed the issue as one of technological reciprocity. This led many on the Japanese side to interpret the U.S. initiative as an effort to gain Japanese technology and cash rather than to assist Japan in defending itself against missile attacks.<sup>14)</sup>

The U.S. misjudgment of Japan's willingness to collaborate on TMD eventually led the two governments to agree upon a different approach to TMD. In 1994, they established a bilateral TMD working group. This offered U.S. defense analysts an opportunity to see the political obstacles facing its ally. Although many Japanese defense experts supported

TMD, for many in Japan the idea of building up a new defense system would merely inspire potential foes to produce an equal and opposite reaction. This would eventually lead to an arms race in Asia, the dangers of which would far outweigh the existing danger of missile attack from countries that lack Japan's industrial capacity.<sup>15)</sup>

For several years, U.S.-Japan discussions of TMD moved forward slowly. By 1997, despite a lack of broad-based political support, the Japanese Defense Agency had concluded that the NTW system would be the one most amenable to bilateral cooperation and the one capable of defending Japan most effectively.<sup>16)</sup> The formal decision to go forward on NTW, however, had to be postponed because of pressure from Beijing and a lack of consensus on the desirability of TMD in Japan. Elements within the Liberal Democratic Party questioned the technical feasibility and cost of TMD. Meanwhile, Chinese opposition to TMD coupled with China's rather aggressive missile development program raised the arms race specter once again. Again, political support to go forward was lacking.<sup>17)</sup>

In August 1998, however, the North Koreans launched a test flight of a Taepodong-1 missile, which crossed Japanese airspace before falling into the Pacific Ocean. This event profoundly altered the Japanese perception of its security environment and led to an agreement with the U.S. to collaborate on TMD. One year after the North Korean provocation, Japan signed a memorandum of understanding in Washington, D.C. which described the various technologies that would be developed and included approximately a \$200million Japanese contribution to research costs over the next five to six years.<sup>18)</sup>

These recent developments appear to bring the two nations closer together on security issues. In a broader sense, however, TMD continues to represent potential harm to the U.S.-Japan alliance and to confront the U.

S. faces with a series of dilemmas. For one thing, the U.S. must continue to promote cooperation with Japan on TMD while remaining sensitive to Japanese concerns about TMD's dangers. If it fails in the former, it will suffer a loss of credibility. If it fails in the latter, it will face a loss of Japanese trust. Another dilemma is that the U.S. must also reinforce confidence in the deterrent effect of TMD while it encourages Japan to take an increasingly active role in strategic defense. If either of these evaporates, the entire partnership will be in jeopardy. Finally, the U.S. must dispel suspicions on the Japanese side that the U.S. is more interested in Japanese money and technology than in the defense of Japan, while encouraging continued sharing of technology.<sup>19)</sup> These dilemmas require serious study and broad-based discussion within U.S. defense policy-making circles. In any such discussion the wisdom of TMD development and development must be left as an open question. The danger, however, is that these subtle but important and enduring threats to the stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance will be crowded off the agenda on the U.S. side by short term, political motivations, particularly in the U.S. Congress.

## **V. The TMD Improvement Act of 1998 : A Case Study**

Action in the House of Representatives involving the TMD Improvement Act of 1998 illustrates the mix of domestic and foreign political concerns in the role of Congress in making TMD policy.<sup>20)</sup> In late 1997, members of the House National Security Committee (now the Armed Services Committee) were alarmed by news that North Korea had deployed the No Dong-1 missile in significant numbers. They noted that the No Dong-1 had a range of about 1,000 kilometers, sufficient to threaten nearly all of Japan and the U.S. forces stationed in Northeast Asia. They had also learned that Iran was making surprising progress on

the development of two missiles, the Shahab-3 with a range of about 1,300 kilometers, and the Shahab-4 with a 2,000-kilometer range. The Shahab-3, therefore, could reach Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel while the Shahab-4 could threaten much of Europe.<sup>21)</sup>

In response, the members of the Research and Development Subcommittee drafted legislation (H.R.2786) to authorize \$147 million in additional appropriations to the Department of Defense for theater missile defense development. After the bill was introduced in the House in October of 1997, it was referred to the National Security Committee and then to the Research and Development Subcommittee. The Subcommittee held hearings, published its findings and unanimously recommended passage of the bill. The bill was subsequently approved by the full committee and sent to the floor of the House where, on March 26, 1998, it passed by voice vote.

After its introduction, this bill was also referred to the House International Relations Committee, which waived jurisdiction over the bill and supported its passage exactly as drafted by the Research and Development Subcommittee.<sup>22)</sup> The International Relations Committee might have held its own hearings to explore the alliance implications of both the growing missile threat and accelerated development of the U.S. missile defense program. This Committee could have inquired into whether such expenditures would have increased or decreased the threat, or whether key allies thought that another strategy would be more effective in reducing the threat. The work of the International Relations Committee on this bill would not necessarily have taken any longer than that of the Research and Development Subcommittee. It might have added important guidance and persuasive evidence regarding the views and needs of U.S. allies on the subject. Surely, if the missile threat were as urgent as it appeared to these House members, the international

relations side of the problem was just as important as the development of the technology. Instead, the International Relations Committee deferred to the Research and Development Subcommittee adding nothing to the latter's findings.

I think this demonstrates an important aspect of the role of Congress in TMD, which is perhaps best illuminated by examining data on specific characteristics of the congressional districts represented by the members of the Research and Development Subcommittee during that period. Table 3 on the next page lists the members who were on that Subcommittee during the 105th and 106th Congresses and ran for reelection in the 2000 campaign. The table includes the number of military bases in each district, the total numbers of military and civilian personnel employed on those bases, the presence of significant defense contractors in those districts, and the amount of campaign contributions from defense contractors to the members during the 1999–2000 election cycle.

Taken together, the twenty-one members of this Subcommittee represent districts containing forty-three military bases, more than a quarter of a million military personnel, and more than 138,000 civilian employees. The missile defense program benefits only a few of these bases, but its impact can be significant. One such base is Fort Bliss in Texas, which is located mainly in the sixteenth district, represented by subcommittee member Silvestre Reyes, a Democrat. In connection with the TMD Improvement Act, Representative Reyes attached a memo to the committee report on the bill, which stated in part :

"Fort Bliss, located in my district, trains all of the soldiers who provide air and missile defense for our military... most of the Patriot batteries are located at Fort Bliss. As such, the increased funds for PAC-3 technologies will directly affect

these soldiers." <sup>23)</sup>

Mr. Reyes's concern was for the welfare of the soldiers rather than for the utility of missile defense, but his rationale for funding TMD was persuasive to those who did not benefit from it directly. In this way, subcommittee members engaged in logrolling, an "all for one, one for all" activity in which a member will support appropriations that benefit others in exchange for support from those others at a later date. In this instance, it may have helped enhance support for the TMD Improvement Act.

A more significant factor affecting congressional support for overall TMD expansion, however, may be the campaign contributions of major defense contractors. As the table shows, total contributions to members of the subcommittee in both parties from political action committees representing defense contractors in the 1999–2000 election cycle are equal to \$542,810. The twenty-one subcommittee members who voted on the TMD Improvement Act and ran in the 2000 election, therefore, received an average of \$25,848 in campaign contributions from defense contractors. The twelve Republicans, representing the majority party, were given \$344,960 for an average of \$28,747, while the nine Democrats collected a total of \$197,850 for a \$21,983 average. Being a member of the majority party on this subcommittee, therefore, meant an advantage of nearly \$7,000 in contributions from major defense contractors.

Regardless of party, however, members from districts where major defense contractors operated as significant employers held an even greater advantage in campaign fundraising. Table 3 identifies those subcommittee members who have such contractors in their districts and those who do not. In table 4 on page 10, I have compared the mean of total defense contractor contributions for these two groups on the

**Table 3.**  
**Members of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee**  
**House National Security (Armed Services) Committee**  
**105 th Congress (1997–1998 )**

Member	District Characteristics				1999–2000**
	N of Bases*	N of Military Employees*	N of Civilian Employees*	Presence of major Defense Contractors*	Contractor Campaign Contributions
Republicans :					
Weldon***	0	--	--	Yes	\$ 80,000
Kasich	1	--	2,900	No	\$ 1,000
Bateman	4	16,000	9,000	Yes	\$ 20,500
Hefley	4	22,100	9,000	Yes	\$ 15,500
McHugh	1	10,200	2,200	Yes	\$ 7,250
Hostettler	1	100	4,000	No	0
Chambliss	1	5,000	12,000	Yes	\$ 53,500
Hilleary	0	--	--	No	0
Scarborough	5	36,000	12,000	No	\$ 39,000
Jones	5	54,000	12,000	Yes	\$ 47,460
Riley	2	4,800	4,900	Yes	\$ 54,500
Gibbons	2	7,500	2,500	No	\$ 26,250
Rep. Total	26	155,900	70,000		<u>\$344,960</u>
				Mean for Rep. 's :	\$ 28,747
Democrats :					
Pickett	5	73,000	39,000	Yes	\$ 11,000
Abercrombie	7	16,000	9,000	No	\$ 14,000
Meehan	0	--	--	No	0
Kennedy	2	2,000	5,000	Yes	\$ 40,600
Blagoyevich	0	--	--	Yes	\$ 13,000
Reyes	1	12,000	7,000	Yes	\$ 24,250
Allen	2	1,000	8,000	No	\$ 24,000
Turner	0	--	--	Yes	\$ 30,500
Sanchez	0	--	--	Yes	\$ 40,500
Dem. Total	17	104,000	68,000		<u>\$197,850</u>
				Mean for Dem. 's :	\$ 21,983
Grand Total	43	259,900	138,000		<u>\$542,810</u>

Sources : \*Data on military bases and presence of defense contractors in districts is found in Philip D. Duncan and Brian Nutting (eds.) *Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America, 2000 : The 106 th Congress* (Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1999) pp. 14, 207, 242, 288, 380, 400, 436, 502, 594, 650, 832, 971, 1005, 1079, 1168, 1213, 1265, 1328, 1403, and 1406.

\*\*Data on defense contractor campaign contributions is collected by the Federal Election Commission and made available through Project Vote Smart at <http://www.vote-smart.org>. Campaign contribution data are complete through the 1999–2000 election cycle.

\*\*\*Denotes Subcommittee Chairman.

**Table 4**  
**Defense Contractor Contributions to Subcommittee Members With and Without Major Defense Contractors in Their Districts**

	N	Total	Mean
With	13	\$438,560	\$33,735
Without	8	\$104,250	\$13,031
Difference (With–Without)		\$334,310	\$20,704

Source : Data extrapolated from Table 3 on p. 9.

Subcommittee.

The thirteen members of the Subcommittee who represent districts in which major defense contractors employ large numbers of workers obtained total contributions from defense contractors of \$438,560, an average of \$33,735 from political action committees representing defense contractors. The eight members who had no such contractors in their districts obtained a total of \$104,250 for an average of \$13,031. The difference between the two groups in total amount of defense contractor contributions is \$334,310; the difference between the means is \$20,704 per member.

The chairman of the Subcommittee, Representative Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, was not only the leading force behind the TMD Improvement Act, but also the member who raised the greatest amount of money from defense contractors: \$80,000 in the 1999–2000 election cycle. Although he has no military bases in his district, defense contractors Lockheed–Martin and Boeing have large offices and plants there, employing an estimated thirteen thousand of Rep. Weldon's constituents.<sup>24)</sup>

Campaign contributions, however, are not the only motivations behind Rep. Weldon's legislative activity on TMD. Although his district benefits greatly from the increased expenditures, he is also one of the most knowledgeable members in the House on U.S. relations with Russia and China. While many of the members of his party take an isolationist approach toward both

countries, Rep. Weldon advocates close consultations and normal trade relations with both governments. For Rep. Weldon, the economic interests of his district have a special congruence with his well-considered foreign policy views. Despite Rep. Weldon's expertise in the area, however, the alliance implications of TMD were given no attention during the entire seven-month period from the time the bill was introduced in October until the time it passed in March of the following year. One cannot fault Rep. Weldon for his concern over the safety of deployed U.S. forces, especially since forty of the victims of Scud attack in Dharan were members of the Pennsylvania National Guard, his home state. Nevertheless, in the debate over the TMD Improvement Act, the alliance implications of TMD received little attention from congressional policymakers.

## VI. Conclusion

The role of Congress in the making of policy on TMD, therefore, is a product of the cumulative motivations of its members, which are oriented toward reelection. The eagerness with which members of Congress pursue economic benefits for their districts, claim credit for securing those benefits, and seek financial help for their reelection campaigns must give U.S. allies reason to be careful. In the case of TMD as it affects the U.S.–Japan security relationship, these motivations create deep concern. The lack of engagement on the part of Congress in analyzing the

alliance dilemmas facing U.S. policy makers can have several negative consequences. Assuming that TMD has merit as a military strategy in Northeast Asia, the neglect of Japanese concerns on this subject can defeat the entire U.S.-Japan collaboration by undermining both U.S. credibility and Japanese trust. Worse than that, the entire U.S.-Japan relationship will be placed at risk if the Japanese side perceives that Japanese concerns count for next to nothing in congressional deliberations. This conclusion, however, is virtually inescapable when one examines the handling of the Theater Missile Defense Improvement Act of 1998 by the National Security Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives.

Japan, of course, is not represented in these deliberations. No electoral connection links Japanese interests to the key committees in the U.S. Congress. Congressional spending for defense, however, has a profound impact on U.S. alliance relationships. If Congress focuses too closely on immediate political and economic benefits, it may misjudge the broader, international questions and place allies at risk while trying to protect them. For U.S.-Japan TMD collaboration to succeed, it is imperative that members of the U.S. Congress devote more time to the study of the alliance implications of such a collaboration.

Japan, meanwhile, would be wise to form its own consensus on TMD development and express that consensus as loudly and clearly as possible so that it may be heard above the hubbub of congressional wheeling and dealing. Otherwise, the Japanese message to the U.S. on TMD may be lost. Some ears in the U.S. are attuned to hear that message, but most of them are not presently in the Congress.

## Notes

- 1) Congress, House, *Department of Defense Appropriations Act*, 2001, 106th Cong., 2d sess., H.R.4576, Congressional Record (July 17, 2000) pp. H 6102–H 6345. For a brief analysis of fiscal 2001 defense budget see Pat Towell, "Camouflage Green Defense Bill Poised for President's Signature," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, July 22, 2000, pp.1819–1822.
- 2) Pat Towell, "Pentagon's Chief of Testing Reinforces Bipartisan Movement to Postpone Anti-Missile System," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, Vol.58, No.8 (Feb.19, 2000), p.373.
- 3) Kori J. Urayama, "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XL, No.4 (July/August, 2000), pp.601–602.
- 4) *Ibid.*, pp.603–607.
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## American Security Policy toward Northeast Asia : Focusing on Theater Missile Defense (TMD)

Setsuo Takeda (Nihon University)

The author identifies a specific problem in understanding the development of American theater missile defense (TMD) policy: what factors motivate members of U.S. Congress to support increased expenditures for TMD? The author begins with the assumption that members of U.S. Congress are "single-minded seekers of reelection," and search out the links between expansion of TMD programs and

increased probability of reelection. The paper lays foundation for its analysis of this problem by exploring the history of TMD development, the capabilities of current TMD programs, and the trends in funding for TMD as broadly compared to the proposed national missile defense system (NMD).

The paper then takes up a case study of the Theater Missile Defense Improvement Act of 1998 as handled



by the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the House National Security Committee. The Subcommittee investigated the capabilities of missile systems under development in Iran, Iraq and North Korea before recommending a \$147million supplementary appropriation for TMD. The author notes that the Committee on International Relations, which could have examined the alliance implications of such an expansion of the TMD weapons program, waived jurisdiction over the bill and endorsed the findings of the Subcommittee. The bill subsequently passed the House of Representatives by voice vote.

The author then points out, among other things, that subcommittee members received significant campaign contributions from the political action committees of high-tech defense contractors residing in their districts. The members of the majority party on the subcommittee, the Republicans, generally received more money than the Democrats did. The mean contribution level for Republicans was \$28,747 compared to \$21,983 for Democrats. This is a difference of \$7,764 on average.

The author, however, also looked at average contributions to subcommittee members who had major defense contractors operating as significant employers

in their districts compared to those who did not have such employers in their districts. The subcommittee members who had major defense employers in their districts had average contributions from political action committees representing the defense industry of \$33,735. Those without such employers in their districts received an average of \$13,031 from these committees, a difference of \$20,704.

The author concludes that U.S. – Japan alliance problems receive little attention in congressional TMD policy-making, that reelection concerns of the members of Congress tend to be more salient than such problems. They warn that if U.S. Congress focuses too narrowly on such immediate political and economic benefits, it may misjudge broader issues and place allies at risk while trying to protect them.

Japan, meanwhile, must form its own consensus on TMD development and express its interests loudly and clearly if they are to be heard. Assuming the TMD has merit as a means to defend the security of Northeast Asia, congressional neglect of Japanese concerns can undermine both U.S. credibility and Japanese trust while placing the entire U.S. – Japan TMD collaboration risk.